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Abstract 
 
Behavioral economics is widely recognized as a rising field in economics, one whose 
discoveries and implications are not yet completed or understood. At the same time, 
economic theory plays an enormous role in our governmental and legal system. In 
particular, the Coase Theorem and its implications have affected nearly every area in the 
field of law and economics. This paper proposes a experimental test of Coasean 
bargaining in situations using two competitive players whose payoffs depend on 
minimizing their costs of mitigating the externality. A rational player’s action can be 
predicted ahead of time, and the rationality of the game’s outcome can be objectively 
measured. If behavioral effects found in consumer goods situations by other 
experimenters carry over to competitive business situations, then a substantial review of 
law regarding such situations is in order. 
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Introduction 
Economic theory is not an obvious part of our everyday life. Very few people can 
easily name an economist, and even fewer can name anyone other than Milton Friedman 
and Paul Krugman. But classical economic theory has pervasively shaped every part of 
our government, economic, and law system. American society is built on trusting the 
invisible hand to guide our markets and efficiently allocate our scarce resources. Our 
government, particularly the bill of rights, was founded on the belief that restricting the 
power of the government to regulate our personal and economic behavior leads to better 
outcomes. And our legal system, while heavily based on tradition and precedent, is also 
predicated on promoting economic efficiency and competition. 
Therefore, advances in economic theory have a enormous long term effect on our 
country; each small new discovery, each time a theory is significantly altered, starts a 
process that can completely redefine a law, an industry, or even the entire economy. 
While this process can decades, it is critical to keeping our economy efficient and 
creating the correct incentives for businesses and individuals. No single idea has had a 
greater impact on the economic analysis of law than the Coase Theorem (“CT”); its 
implications can be felt in every major area of law where the prerogative is balancing the 
incentives of parties to create economic efficiency, including but not limited to property 
 2 
law1, tort law2, product liability3, nuisance law4, intellectual property5, environmental 
law6 divorce law7. 
However, CT rests on the assumption that both parties involved in bargaining are 
not systematically irrational. The explosion of the field of behavioral economics has 
created much support for the theory that not only do humans vary dramatically with 
respect to economic decisions, they are systematically irrational. The finding of many 
researchers, led by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is that humans are systematically loss 
and risk averse, preference inconsistent, and highly attached to their initial state8. 
Out of these irrationalities grow a number of well-defined and documented biases. 
The endowment effect, in particular, has been considered a striking problem for the 
Coase theorem. The endowment effect (“EE”), which simply states that as soon as a party 
establishes ownership of a good, their valuation of it jumps by a significant amount, 
would hinder rational bargaining from taking place, as each party would overvalue their 
assets relative to the other person’s assets. But until now, these experiments, especially 
the ones studying EE have focused on tangible consumer goods, not rights and products 
                                                 
1
 Posner, Richard A., and Francesco Parisi. 2002. "The Economic Foundations of Private Law: An 
Introduction." In Economic foundations of private law, ix-xxix. Elgar Critical Writings Readers., 2002.  
2
 Medema, Steven G. 1995. The legacy of Ronald Coase in economic analysis. 2 vols. Intellectual Legacies 
in Modern Economics series., 1995.  
3
 Sykes, Alan O., ed. 2007. Economics of Tort Law. 2 vols. Economic Approaches to Law, vol. 11. An 
Elgar Reference Collection., 2007.  
4
 Rosenthal, Leslie. 2007. "Economic Efficiency, Nuisance, and Sewage: New Lessons from Attorney-
General v. Council of the Borough of Birmingham, 1858-95." Journal of Legal Studies 36, no. 1: 27-62.  
5
 Besen, Stanley M., Willard G., Jr. Manning, and Bridger M. Mitchell. 2002. "Copyright Liability for 
Cable Television: Compulsory Licensing and the Coase Theorem." In The economics of intellectual 
property. Volume 1. Introduction and copyright, 495-523. International Library of Critical Writings in 
Economics, vol. 145., 2002.  
6
 Bartsch, Elga. 1998. Liability for environmental damages: Incentives for precaution and risk allocation. 
Kieler Studien 292., 1998.  
7
 Wickelgren, Abraham L. 2009. "Why Divorce Laws Matter: Incentives for Noncontractible Marital 
Investments under Unilateral and Consent Divorce." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 25, no. 
1: 80-106.  
8
 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica 47, no. 2: 263-291.  
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in a competitive business situation. 
 
 
 
Part I: The Importance of Coase 
The Coase Theorem 
Published in 1960, Ronald Coase’s paper, “The Problem of Social Cost”, instantly 
became a magnet for criticism9. It simultaneously challenged the standard assumption in 
welfare economics that Pigouvian taxes were the most efficient solution for internalizing 
externalities, as well as redefining the problem in such a way that all analysis was forced 
to change. First and foremost, Coase was interested in economic efficiency; he did not 
dispute that in many cases Pigouvian taxes were efficiency maximizing, but merely 
demonstrated that there is a class of cases in which it is not. He also demonstrated some 
serious flaws in Pigouvian reasoning, first and foremost the assumption that the cost of an 
externality should always fall squarely on the producer. 
 Before Coase, externalities were viewed primarily as a cost that should be 
internalized by the producer in order to ensure the optimal amount of production would 
take place. Coase demonstrated that in fact the problem is reciprocal; the producer’s 
externality clearly harms the second party, but without the second party, no harm occurs. 
Therefore the presence of the second party harms the producer. If the goal of the court is 
to promote social welfare, it must determine which side creates more social value through 
                                                 
9
 Coase, R. H. 2009. "The Problem of Social Cost." In Economics of Environmental Law. Volume 1. 
Theoretical Foundations, 3-46. An Elgar Reference Collection. Economic Approaches to Law, vol. 22. 
Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar,  
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their activity, and force the other side to bear the cost. This, not the observation that in 
some cases regulation is not the best answer, is the true value of his paper. 
In some cases, like pollution, the harm of the externality is unavoidable and 
spread over the population. But in some cases, especially in which the externality takes 
place only between two parties, internalizing the externality is not so simple. In Coase’s 
first example, the very famous case of Sturges v. Bridgman (1879), we can see that the 
externality comes into existence as a result of both parties’ actions. In this case, a 
confectionary had long been operating across a courtyard from a doctor’s office10. The 
doctor, wishing to service more patients, added a shed adjoining the wall to be used as an 
examining room. The shed became unusable because the noise and rumbling from the 
confectionary was too great. Coase argues that the court’s ruling, rather than being based 
on the fact that the confectionary was causing the externality, should have been whether 
the value of the additional doctoring warranted the cost of the confectionary mitigating 
the noise and rumbling, through moving operations or other means.   
 Common to most criticisms of the Coase theorem is that some part of the theorem 
does not actually represent the situation it purports to study; in many cases these are 
situations Coase himself addressed, and these will not be treated as real objections to the 
theory. For example, transaction costs are clearly part of the real world, but in different 
situations these transaction costs can range from prohibitive to almost unnoticeable. 
Therefore claiming the Coase theorem is invalid on the grounds it doesn’t account for 
transaction costs is not a true objection to the theory. However, there do exist numerous 
objections to the Coase theorem, both to its internal logic and its practicality in the real 
                                                 
10
 The Story of Sturges v. Bridgman: The Resolution of Land Use Disputes Between Neighbors' in G 
Korngold and AP Morriss, Property Stories (2nd edn Foundation Press, New York 2009) 
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world. However, for such an objection to be truly useful, it must not also apply in equal 
measure to any other alternative. For example, a problem that invalidates both the Coase 
theorem and Pigouvian taxes does not inform us about which is the optimal solution 
when choosing between the two, it only proves that neither solution is perfect.  
Andrew Halpin (2007) attempts to disprove the fundamental assumption of the 
Coase theorem by arguing that in three situations, the Coase theorem does not hold true 
even under the assumption of perfect information and no transaction costs11. His 
objection centers on the fact that Coase did not address the presence of economic rents in 
his theory. He poses three situations in which this poses trouble for the Coase theorem; 
first, if the side that must compensate currently derives no economic rent, then 
compensating is economically worse than abandoning their current activity and pursuing 
the second best alternative. Second, in situations where the rent is exactly equal for both 
sides and are less than the damage caused by the externality, then legal rules, by default, 
determine the person who continues their activities. And finally, if the loss of rents force 
one side to halt activity, then the externality will still potentially be imposed on the next 
user of the land. 
First, in a perfect competition situation in which neither party is receiving an 
economic rent from their activity, the necessity of buying the externality right or 
compensating the economic party will push the margin of that party below the point at 
which switching to another activity is more profitable. This first situation fails for a litany 
of reasons, most importantly of which is the assumption that the parties have no idea, a 
priori, what the cost of the externality would be. In a world in which information is 
                                                 
11
 Halpin, Andrew. 2007. "Disproving the Coase Theorem?." Economics and Philosophy 23, no. 3: 321-
341.  
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perfect, as assumed by the Coase theorem, each party would know the legal rule 
regarding their case, and would take into account the cost their liability might impose. 
Second, in this situation, pigouvian taxes or an established legal rule create the exact 
same problem; therefore this objection fails to provide a better framework for 
determining a solution.  
Both his second and third objections fail this problem as well; while we might 
prefer a legal or government intervention to determine which activity is the most socially 
valuable, our courts and government tend to take the view that the producer of the 
externality should bear its costs, ignoring the reciprocal problem that Coase explained in 
his work. While a government intervention may eventually become necessary if dealing 
with the cost of the externality would force either to become unprofitable, this situation 
seems likely in only a small number of cases.  
 
Law and Coase 
Product liability law is an excellent example of how changes in business practices 
and consumer demographics require a commensurate shift in law for the industry to 
remain efficient. “Caveat Emptor”, colloquially known as “buyer beware”, was at one 
time an economically efficient legal setting for product liability. Before the industrial 
revolution, almost all goods were handmade and sold person-to-person, while written 
contracts were only the norm for high-end goods, and goods were technologically simple 
enough that a learned intermediary was unnecessary. Because of this, the law dictated 
that all liability for malfunction lay on the part of the consumer; they were expected to 
have sufficient knowledge of the product to spot defects. As mass production become 
 7 
more commonplace and goods became too complicated for a layman to sufficiently 
inspect, contracts became the standard business practice. The doctrine of privity, in which 
suit could occur only over breach of contract, became the law.  
The case McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) was the first to mark a dramatic 
shift to emphasizing consumer protection12. The plaintiff, McPherson, had bought a 
Buick car from a dealer, with whom he had a contract. The Buick, which had been 
defectively made, underwent a wheel collapse, injuring the plaintiff. He brought suit 
against the Buick Motor Co. even though he did not have a contract with them, claiming 
that they were the least cost avoider of the accident and had made a defective product, 
and should therefore be liable for the accident. The court upheld that a reasonable 
inspection by Buick Motor Co. could have avoided the accident, and thus there were 
guilty of negligence. This began the shift from doctrine of privity to one of producer 
negligence. The courts decided that the producer was the lowest cost avoider, not the 
buyer or the intermediary. 
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1944) marked the final major evolution in 
liability law13. Escola, a waitress, was putting away bottles of Coca-Cola when one of the 
bottles spontaneously exploded in her hands. Although the lower courts found for the 
plaintiff on the grounds that the company had been negligible in not testing the bottles 
properly, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court wrote a concurrent opinion 
claiming that in almost all cases, the manufacturer was better equipped to deal with the 
externalities of its product and was the least cost avoider of injurer. Furthermore, because 
any increase in testing/design costs could be distributed to the public through price 
                                                 
12
 161 A.D. 906 145 N.Y.S. 1132 1914 N.Y. App. Div. 
13
 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
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increases, imposing strict liability would far more often lead to the socially optimal level 
of output in an industry. This would be accepted by the California Supreme court in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. (1963) and would standard law in the United 
States and internationally14. 
Underlying all these shifts is the topic of this paper- externalities. Product liability 
was designed, and changed, to attempt to internalize the cost of malfunction most 
efficiently. When goods were simple and contracts were uncommon, consumers were the 
least cost avoider. When contracts become common and technology became moderately 
complex, producers were held liable for breach of contract, and we saw a Coasean 
bargaining situation in which individually determined contracts were the standard. When 
learned intermediaries and distributors became necessary and technology reached a level 
beyond the understanding of most consumers creating information asymmetry, it was 
decided that producers were most often the least cost avoider for harm, and that 
consumers were not informed enough to make optimal decision. Therefore a law of 
producer negligence became standard. Finally, once technology had reached a level 
beyond almost all consumers, and companies were often quite distant from their 
consumers because of intermediaries, strict liability became the most economically 
efficient way to internalize the cost of malfunction. 
There are two main drivers of change in law: recognizing that the industry and its 
interaction with consumers has changed and the application of new research to reevaluate 
existing rules. Product Liability is a clear example of the former; as the market changed, 
the rules changed to maintain efficiency. Reevaluation is usually a slow process; in many 
cases, the existing rules are not inefficient enough to draw significant attention to their 
                                                 
14
 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 1963 Cal. 
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problems, and may take decades to change. In other cases, when a particularly egregious 
case or enormous inefficiency has occurred, change can occur almost instantaneously. On 
the other hand, new research often causes significant reevaluation of past analysis, but 
such reevaluation can take considerable time, and the change can only affect future 
decisions. Sometimes, however, a particular field or finding takes the world by storm, 
drawing significant attention and potentially creating enormous change. 
Behavioral economics represents the latter, and for the purposes of creating 
change in our legal and governmental system, this may actually be a handicap. As a field, 
behavioral economics is in its infancy; most research has been in consumer purchasing 
decisions or how altruism and notions of justice affect decision-making and potential 
applications based on experimental evidence is limited. But the mainstream success and 
popularity of books like “Freakanomics”15 and “Predictably Irrational”16 has created the 
perception that the field is far more developed than it actually is. Overzealous 
interpretations and extrapolations of theories with little or no experimental evidence can 
cause rejection of the field in its entirety and hinder true developments.  
The true flaw behind the Coase theorem is not the presence of transaction costs; 
Coase was well aware of this issue and addressed it thoroughly. Rather, we must focus on 
the actual parties in negotiation. If the sides, even under perfect conditions, are unable to 
adequately reason and bargain, then courts must intervene for the sake of economic 
efficiency. In particular, the initial owner of a legal right must not overvalue its utility, 
and neither side can overvalue their production because of EE. 
                                                 
15
 Levitt, Steven D., and Stephen J. Dubner. 2005. Freakonomics: a rogue economist explores the hidden 
side of everything. New York: William Morrow. 
16
 Ariely, Dan. 2008. Predictably irrational: the hidden forces that shape our decisions. New York, NY: 
Harper. 
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Part II: Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral economics is the “newest” and most innovative field in economics, 
although it really represents a return to studying the “animal instincts” Keynes so 
famously referred to17. The underlying assumption behind most behavioral economics 
research is that the classical rational expectations model does not accurately describe 
behavior at the individual level or the aggregate level. While this may be thought of as 
attacking a straw man, most macroeconomic theory is built on the belief that at the 
aggregate level, people act rationally. 
This distinction is very important; very few people would claim that a rational 
utility maximizing model could describe every individual. But it could accurately 
describe a population, if non-rational behaviors were randomly distributed around a 
rational mean. For example, consider a population in which 100 people are risk neutral, 
50 are risk takers, and 50 are risk avoiders; this means, on average, the entire population 
is risk neutral, the “rational” view. The same could occur for a large number of other 
characteristics considered irrational. And if true, it would mean that we could indeed be 
safe in assuming people are rational at the macroeconomic level. 
But, as numerous researchers have found, people are not only irrational 
                                                 
17
 Keynes, John Maynard. 2008. "The General Theory of Interest, Employment and Money." In 
Financialization at Work: Key Texts and Commentary, 75-81. London and New York: Taylor and Francis, 
Routledge,.  
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individually but are systematically irrational at the population level. Humans, on average, 
are risk averse, loss averse, attached to initial wealth levels, susceptible to framing 
effects, and future discounting. Not only that, they consistently display inconsistent time 
preferences; that is, their preferences change over time, even in remarkably short periods 
of time. The general evidence for deviation from the rational expectations model of 
decision-making is nearly overwhelming and, in time, these findings will have an 
enormous effect on public policy.  
But not yet; most experimental evidence in behavioral economics is focused in a 
distinct area; purchasing decisions and valuations for consumer goods. Furthermore, the 
situations simulated in these experiments are usually low pressure and involve only goods 
of low value; while the experiments are insightful and have laid the foundation for further 
research, their narrow focus means we cannot truly apply these insights to a broader 
spectrum of problems. New experiments need to be more complex to test real world 
situations, and they need to expand beyond consumer product purchasing to have a 
lasting impact on our legal and economic foundations. While archival studies like those 
does in Freakanomics18 are valuable and point out policy problems, they often are not 
experimental tests and are limited in the conclusions one can draw. Of all the studies 
done so far, the most important and applicable are those studying the effect of status quo 
on decision-making, but these only inform us about a small range of human behavior. But 
to understand and reevaluate the rules and laws regarding property, externalities, and 
contracts, a great deal of research and experimentation remains to be done. 
 
                                                 
18
 Levitt, Steven D., and Stephen J. Dubner. 2005. Freakonomics: a rogue economist explores the hidden 
side of everything. New York: William Morrow. 
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Prospect Theory  
Prospect theory and other models of decision making that conflict with rational 
decision theory have undoubtedly improved our understanding of decisions at the 
individual and group level. Insights like the status quo bias19, loss aversion20, and risk 
aversion21 have made formerly puzzling phenomenon easy to explain and manipulate. 
More importantly, these insights have led to changes in the real world. Some, like making 
contribution the default option for workers’ 401K22, have undoubtedly been good for 
individuals and society. Some, like overzealous rejection of the Coase theorem on 
“irrationality” grounds, have been over extensions of theories without experimental 
evidence.  
There are three qualities that distinguish the experimental literature. First, 
participants in prospect theory literature are usually in non-competitive situations. 
Second, the experimental literature primarily deals with consumer goods, not with 
investments, capital goods, or legal rights. Finally, the experimental literature focuses on 
maximization of individual utility, not corporate decision-making. But these three 
characteristics, while shedding a great deal of light on consumer buying habits, disqualify 
most research from being applicable in law and economics or in corporate settings.  
                                                 
19
 Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1999. "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, 
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias." In Environmental valuation. Volume 1.Methods and anomalies, 381-
394. Elgar Reference Collection. Environmental Analysis and Economic Policy, vol. 3., 1999.  
20
 Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1990). Experimental Test of the endowment effect and the 
CoKahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1990. "Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem." Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 6: 1325-1348.  
21
 Arrow, K.J. 1965, "The theory of risk aversion," in Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, by Yrjo 
Jahnssonin Saatio, Helsinki. Reprinted in: Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Markham Publ. Co., 
Chicago, 1971, 90-109. 
22
 Choi, James J.; Laibson, David; and Madrian, Brigitte. 2004. “Plan Design and 401(k) Savings 
Outcomes,” National Tax Journal 52(2) 275-298. 
 13 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974)23 and (1978)24 were the seminal papers of 
prospect theory; through a series of simple experiments on students in their classes, 
which were later run on students at Harvard Business School, they found consistent, 
statistically significant deviations from the rational choice model of decision-making. 
They pinpointed the four areas in which irrationality seems prevalent and consistent: loss 
aversion, risk aversion for gains but risk seeking for losses, framing effects, and fixation 
on their initial endowment, not total wealth levels. Finally, they found that, from their 
initial endowment, people feel diminishing marginal utility from gains and losses. 
First and foremost, they found that people are systematically loss averse. In a 
series of studies, they found that each dollar of loss, psychologically, is felt as powerfully 
as one and a half to two dollars of gain. This has major implications for legal policy, 
because it means that, on average, people are loss averse when it comes to trade or 
investments (when it is their own money). For the Coase theorem specifically, this factor 
becomes more and more powerful as the participants have less information. 
Second, they found that people are risk seeking for losses and risk averse for 
gains. When given a choice between a low probability of high losses or no change and a 
high probability of low losses or no change, even when the high-probability, low-loss, 
option has a slightly better expected value, people overwhelmingly choose to gamble for 
the chance to preserve their initial endowment. This can be explained by the finding that 
people have diminished sensitivity as they move further from their initial endowment and 
in the realm of losses, they try hardest to avoid any loss at all, but as losses mount, the 
                                                 
23
 Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1993. "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." In 
Economics and psychology, 433-440. Elgar Reference Collection series. International Library of Critical 
Writings in Economics, vol. 26., 1993.  
24
 Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica 47, no. 2: 263-291. 
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pain lessens. Therefore they prefer to risk a small probability of a large loss than a high 
probability of a small one. However, when Kahneman and Tversky inverted this decision 
so that participants were facing with a high probability of a small gain and a low 
probability of a large gain, participants overwhelmingly chose the high probability small 
gain. Once again, because participants are fixated on their initial endowment and have 
diminished sensitivity as they move away from it, they preferred the high probability of a 
small gain over the small possibility of a large one. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Kahneman and Tversky (1981)25 found that 
the way information is framed can vastly change the decision made by participants. In 
their most famous example, they gave participants two alternative solutions for a disease 
affecting a hypothetical population of 600 people. Option A saves 200 people’s lives, 
while option B has a 33% chance of saving everyone but a 66% chance of saving no one. 
In this format, 72% of participants chose the conservative option. But when they posed 
the exact same scenario, with the wording changed in option A to 400 people will die, 
and option B to a 33% chance no one will die and a 66% chance 600 people will die, 78% 
of people chose the risky option. By changing the frame from positive, “saving lives”, to 
negative “will die”, they had a complete reversal of preference. This has major 
implications in law and economics; if a company or court knows that it can induce a 
reversal of preference by restating the exact same condition as a loss rather than gain, and 
vice versa, then optimal decision making by participants becomes nearly impossible.  
                                                 
25
 Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 2003. "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice." In Experiments in environmental economics. Volume 2, 173-178. International Library of 
Environmental Economics and Policy., 2003.  
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Joles (2000)26 explores how behavioral economics could impact law. As she 
states, when Kahneman and Tversky performed their original experiments on the 
endowment effect using tokens with pure monetary values, they found that participants 
traded at exactly the rate and level predicted by the Coase theorem, “a striking 
vindication of the Coase theorem”, but then goes on to posit that “The conventional 
normative analysis... cannot survive in the presence of [the endowment effect]).” This, 
while being absolutely true, is not yet supported by experimental literature. The key 
characteristic in experiments vindicating the Coase theorem is that the experimenters 
specified the value of the goods being traded. 
Externalities vary greatly in how easy it is to price them; the greatest problem the 
government grapples with in regulating externalities is placing an accurate price on them, 
and handling variations in that value as market conditions change. However, in a Coasean 
bargaining situation between two actors, information is assumed to be perfect, and even 
in a situation without perfect information, it is expected that both sides will have an 
accurate idea about the value of the externality to their production, and that through 
negotiation or forced reimbursement, the other side will make their valuation of the 
externality clear. Second, as discussed earlier, an externality right may be viewed in the 
same light as an investment or capital good; it is a tool to make more money- a means, 
not an end. Because defined prices, in general, improve rational decision making, goods 
in which private bargaining can discern the price easily will tend to also exhibit more 
rational behavior from the bargainers. 
Experimenters also found that tangibility is a very important factor in the 
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 Jolls, Christine. 2000. "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules." In Behavioral law 
and economics, 288-301. Cambridge Series on Judgment and Decision Making., 2000.  
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activation of the endowment effect. According to Peck and Shu (2009)27, “One feature of 
nearly all endowment effect experiments is that the buyers (nonowners) and the sellers 
(owners) have the opportunity to physically hold the object being traded.” According to 
Wolf, Arkes, and Muhanna (2008)28, increasing the duration of physical contact with an 
item raised the bids placed by subjects on that item. This effect has been replicated with 
many goods, including chocolate bars, lottery tickets, mugs, and pens. (Knetsch and 
Sinden 1984; Franciosi et. al 1996; Kahneman et. al 1990; Johnson et. al 1993). 
However, in a Coasean situation, the legal right is an intangible asset; it remains to be 
seen if such as asset is also subject to the same effect as a good like a mug would be. 
Engelmann and Hollard (2009)29 propose a different way to interpret the 
endowment effect. In functioning markets, they propose the endowment effect occurs 
because of two factors: choice uncertainty (“CU”) and trade uncertainty (“TU”). CU 
occurs when participants are uncertain about the relative value of their choices, while TU  
occurs because of risk and uncertainty about transaction costs and the rules governing the 
market. In a Coasean bargaining situation, both participants are assumed to have perfect 
information about their production function, the other participant’s production function, 
and the cost of the externality; therefore choice uncertainty is not a valid factor. As well, 
in a Coasean bargaining situation there are no transaction costs, and either the rules of the 
market are clearly defined by the courts or there is an absence of a rule, meaning 
participants must bargain or the externality will continue unabated. Therefore trade 
                                                 
27
 Peck, Joann, and Suzanne B. Shu. 2009. "The Effect of Mere Touch on Perceived Ownership." Journal of 
Consumer Research 36, no. 3: 434-447.  
28
 Wolf, James R., Hal R. Arkes, and Waleed A. Muhanna. 2008. "The Power of Touch: An Examination of 
the Effect of Duration of Physical Contact on the Valuation of Objects." Judgment and Decision Making 3, 
no. 6: 476-482.  
29
 Engelmann, Dirk, and Guillaume Hollard. 2009. "A Shock Therapy Against the 'Endowment Effect'." 22 
pages.  
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uncertainty is also not a factor. However, in a Coasean situation where information is 
imperfect or distributed asymmetrically, it is possible that participants will act in ways to 
mitigate CU and TU. But if both sides must make their true valuations clear through 
negotiation or via court, then this effect would likely diminished. As long as both parties 
are forced to bargain openly and in good faith, these particular problems should not be a 
hindrance.  
Plott and Zeiler (2004)30 believe that the robustness of the endowment effect is 
not as settled by experimental literature assumes it to be, and believes that the gap found 
between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”) might be 
dependent on the specific conditions employed by the experimenter in question. 
Specifically, they believe the problem is due to misconceptions the subjects may have 
about the conditions of the experiment in which they take part; they believe that only by 
eliminating subject misconceptions can a definitive experiment take place. They first 
replicate an experiment from Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990)31 on two sets of 
undergraduates and find essentially the same results as the original experiment.  
They then ran their own experiments with three key differences: complete 
anonymity, paid practice, and a demand revealing elicitation device. After inserting these 
three controls to insure that the participants had no misconceptions about the experiment 
or the demand elicitation process, they found no significant difference between WTA and 
WTP. This experiment shows that what we think of as an endowment effect might merely 
reflect the two variables hypothesized in Engelmann and Hollard (2009), choice 
                                                 
30
 Plott, Charles R., and Kathryn Zeiler. 2002. "The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, The 
'Endowment Effect' and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations." 
31
 Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1990. "Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem." Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 6: 1325-1348.  
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uncertainty and trade uncertainty. I believe that these variables mirror those established 
by Plott and Zeiler; anonymity, practice, and a demand recealing solicitation device all 
reduce choice uncertainty. In our experiment, the rules under which the participants 
bargain are clearly explained, reducing trade uncertainty, and in real life the law would 
serve the same purpose.  
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Part III: The Experiment 
Purpose 
The concept behind the experiment is built off two examples used by Coase 
(1960), a rancher whose livestock impose an externality on an adjoining farmer, and a 
railroad company whose railroads occasionally cause sparks that damage a farmer’s crop. 
Aspects from both of these experiment have been taken to fully explore the topic. The 
experiment is meant to mirror a perfect Coasean bargaining situation; both participants 
have complete information, are aware of what the legal rule is if they do not come to an 
agreement, and neither has any transaction costs short of the time spent within the 
experiment. The experiment will run for five rounds, with each player repeating their role 
in each round, but having to adapt to changing legal rules. Experience should ensure that 
by the fifth round, both participants have a fundamental grasp of their production 
function, the other participant’s production function, and the cost of the externality. If 
inefficient bargaining outcomes, especially bargaining that seems to exhibit the 
endowment effect, is still found by the fifth round then this would indicate that 
behavioral effects, rather than any other factor, is the underlying cause of the deviation. 
The order of the rules is randomized, meaning that experience effects will occur equally 
for each condition. 
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Design 
The primary experiment is designed to see if participants’ behavior deviates from 
the rational outcome that should be expect in a Coasean bargaining situation. Two 
participants take part in a game in which their final payoff is primarily determined by 
their choices with their resources and their bargaining with each other. One participant is 
a farmer, denoted as F, and one participant is a rancher, denoted as R. The game will take 
place anonymously on computers separated in different locations so that neither player 
ever know whom they are playing with. Their land and the other player’s land will be 
visible on the computer screen to increase tangibility and understanding of the situation, 
and participants will use a chat box to negotiate before they make their production 
decisions. In the primary version, each will have full knowledge of their production 
function, the other player’s production function, the legal right each has, and the full 
range of options available, mirroring a perfect Coase situation. 
Each participant can utilize their land to produce a good; the farmer can choose 
between two crops, a high-yield wheat crop that is hurt by the rancher, or a low yield 
potato crop that is totally resistant, but he can only choose to plant one of the two. The 
rancher can rise up to five head of cattle on his land, with diminishing returns to scale so 
that the marginal cost of the fifth head is exactly equal to the marginal revenue he 
receives from it. Each head of cattle on the ranch increases the externality imposed on the 
farmer at an increasing rate, reflecting the increasing number of cattle that will seek to 
graze on the farmers land. Finally, both participants receive a small and equal payoff 
from “land appreciation” each turn.  
In the absence of externalities, the rancher would choose to raise five head of 
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cattle and the farmer would choose to use his entire land to farm wheat, maximizing their 
individual payoffs. There are six possible solutions to remove the externality: either the 
farmer or the rancher can shut down, a fence can be erected at X cost, the farmer can 
plant potatoes instead of wheat, the farmer can pay the rancher to reduce the externality, 
or the rancher can reimburse the farmer for the damage his cattle does. In the conditions 
currently designed, shut down for either the farmer or rancher will never be efficient. In 
only one case will it be close to efficient for rancher-farmer reimbursement to occur, 
meaning that the bargainers realistically have three options to choose from in each case. 
 
Payoffs 
In the first scenario, the farmer has the property right, meaning the rancher is 
enjoined from causing an externality, or the farmer can accept compensation. The 
farmer’s payoff is P(f)=V(c)-X+V(r)+A(p), where V(c) is the final value of his crops, X 
is the externality imposed, and V(r) is the reimbursement the rancher may make, in 
whatever form, the rancher pays, and A(p) is the appreciation of his property. The 
rancher’s payoff is P(r)=V(ca)-R(r)+A(p)-C(e), where V(ca) is the final value of his 
cattle, V(r) is the reimbursement he pays to the farmer, A(p) is the appreciation of his 
property, and C(e) is the cost of whatever solution he uses to mitigate the externality. The 
total social value is P(r)+P(f)+C(f), where C(f) is the cost of a fence if one is built. 
In this scenario, if behavior is optimal, then the rancher will end up with a profit 
of $150. He has two ways to mitigate the externality; he can reduce his production down 
to 2 head of cattle and reimburse the farmer for $200 in damages from the externality, or 
he can raise 4 or 5 head of cattle and build a fence for $350, leaving him with a profit of 
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$500-$350=$150. A rational farmer will always grow wheat in this scenario. From the 
social point of view, it would preferable that a fence is built, bringing total social product 
to $3850, the production of the farmer, rancher, and the cost of the fence. 
 
In the second scenario, the rancher has the property right, he can choose to ranch 
at whatever level he wishes, and the farmer can pay for a solution or take on the full 
externality cost. In such a scenario, the farmer’s payoff is P=V(c)-[X or C(e)]-P(r)+A(p), 
where all variables are the same except C(e) is the cost of the solution the farmer takes. 
The rancher’s payoff is P=V(ca)+A(p)+P(f), where all variables are the same except R(f) 
is the payment the farmer may make to him/her. The total social value is P(r)+P(f)+C(f), 
where C(f) is the cost of a fence if one is built. 
In this scenario, if behavior is optimal, the farmer will make a profit of $150. He 
has three options; he can pay the rancher $150 to reduce his production to two steers, 
which would create an externality of $200, causing a total cost of $350, leaving him with 
a profit of $150. The rancher’s profit will always be $500, either by reducing production 
to 2 steers and being compensated by the farmer, or by raising five steers if the farmer 
builds a fence. From the social point of view, it would preferable that a fence is built, 
bringing total social product to $3850, the production of the farmer, rancher, and the cost 
of the fence. 
In the third scenario, the farmer has the liability right, meaning that the rancher is 
liable for any damage done to his land, but he cannot enjoin the rancher from continuing 
to impose the externality. Therefore, the farmer’s payoff is P=V(c)-X+V(r)+A(p). The 
rancher’s payoff is P=V(ca)-C(e)-V(r)+A(p). The total social value is P(r)+P(f)+C(f), 
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where C(f) is the cost of a fence if one is built. 
This scenario creates the same condition as the first; if behavior is optimal, then 
the rancher will end up with a profit of 150. He has two ways to mitigate the externality; 
he can reduce his production down to 2 head of cattle and reimburse the farmer for $200 
in damages from the externality, or he can raise 4 or 5 head of cattle and build a fence for 
$350, leaving him with a profit of $500-$350=$150. A rational farmer will always grow 
wheat in this scenario. From the social point of view, it would preferable that a fence is 
built, bringing total social product to $3850, the production of the farmer, rancher, and 
the cost of the fence. 
In the fourth scenario, the rancher has the liability rule. In this case, the rancher 
can be enjoined to stop his externality by the farmer, but the farmer must pay restitution 
for the rancher’s course of action. In such a case, the farmer’s payoff is P=V(c)-
V(r)+A(p), where V(r) is the payment made to the rancher as restitution. The rancher’s 
payoff is nominally P=Ca(v)+A(p)+R(f)-C(e), but because C(e) and R(f) are equal in 
value, the payoff is actually P=Ca(v)+A(p). The total social value is P(r)+P(f)+C(f), 
where C(f) is the cost of a fence if one is built. 
In this scenario if behavior is optimal, the rancher will spend $350 on a fence and 
be reimbursed by the farmer, leaving the farmer with $150 in profit and the rancher with 
$500. Alternatively, as outlined in scenario two, the farmer can force the rancher to 
reduce his production to 2 steers, but must reimburse him for the lost profit, a total of 
$150, which would create an externality of $200, creating a total cost of $350 and leaving 
his profit at $150. From the social point of view, it would preferable that a fence is built, 
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bringing total social product to $3850, the production of the farmer, rancher, and the cost 
of the fence.  
In the fifth scenario, neither side has an externality right, introducing a condition 
of imperfect information. Rather, they only know that if they do not reach a compromise, 
there is a 50% chance the rancher will be forced to reimburse the farmer and a 50% 
chance the farmer will have to bear the cost of the externality. If the two do not reach a 
bargain, the payoff of the farmer is P(f)=V(c)-.5C(e)-C(p)-C(s)+A(p), where C(p) is the 
payment he makes to the rancher and C(s) is the cost of whatever solution might be 
taken. The rancher’s payoff is P(r)=V(r)-.5C(e)-C(p)-C(s)+A(p). The total social value is 
P(r)+P(f)+C(f), where C(f) is the cost of a fence if one is built. 
In this case, the optimal course of action is for the two players to pool their 
resources and collaboratively construct the fence; this would cost each $175 in profit, 
leaving them both with $325 in profit. In this case, the socially optimal outcome is the 
only optimal outcome; a total of $3850 will be produced. 
 
Experimental Conclusions 
 Under these conditions, a fence is always the preferable option from a social point 
of view, and in fact, the same outcome occurs in all scenarios, with wealth levels only 
changing depending on what legal right defines the transaction. However, if conditions 
were tweaked, for example if the fence cost $400 instead of $350, then every scenario 
except the fifth would change. Under the scenarios where the farmer has the right, the 
rancher would have to reduce his production levels to 2 head of cattle, creating a situation 
in which social wealth is decreased. Under the scenarios where the rancher has the right, 
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the farmer would switch to potatoes, also reducing social wealth. However, in the fifth 
condition, a fence would still be optimal choice for the participants creating the socially 
efficient outcome, and demonstrating that the absence of a property right can, in some 
scenarios, be better than an established legal right.  
 Each of these scenarios, as well as the production functions, is open to change, 
which can change the optimal outcomes. These production functions are meant to show 
that, in some cases, the optimal solution from the point of the farmer and rancher may not 
coincide with the optimal solution from society’s point of view, and that the way property 
rights are assigned can affect this outcome.  
 
Materials 
Table 3.1 Rancher Production Function 
 
# Of Cattle 
Raised 
Total 
Revenue 
Marginal 
Revenue Total Cost 
Marginal 
Cost 
Externality 
Cost 
 
1 400 400 200 200 100 
2 800 400 450 250 200 
3 1200 400 750 300 300 
4 1600 400 1100 350 500 
5 2000 400 1500 400 750 
 
 Table 3.2 Rancher Profit Function 
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# Of Cattle Raised Profit Profit w/ Externality  
1 200 100  
2 350 150  
3 450 50  
4 500 -100  
5 500 -250  
 
 Table 3.3 Farmer’s Production Function  
Production Method Revenue Cost Profit 
Full field of Wheat 1500 1100 400 
Full field of Potatoes 750 600 150 
 
Table 3.4 Methods of Mitigating the Externality 
Method Cost 
Shutdown by Farmer C(v) 
Shutdown by Rancher Ca(v) 
Fence 200 
Farmer plants potatoes 100 in profit, 400 in revenue 
Farmer pays Rancher to reduce production Variable 
Rancher reimburses farmer Variable 
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Instructions for Participants 
(Farmer) 
In this game we will be testing your ability to negotiate with an anonymous 
partner over an externality he creates. This game will last five rounds, and including 
instruction and review periods should last approximately one hour. Each round is eight 
minutes long; you can converse with your partner after the first two minutes of each 
round via a chat box located at the bottom of your screen. If you do not come to a deal or 
make a decision on how to mitigate the externality during these eight minutes, a rule that 
will be presented to you at the beginning of each round will take effect, and payoffs will 
be determined that way. You must make a decision about production every round. In 
some rounds these rules may force the rancher to reimburse you, in others you may be 
forced to bear the cost of the externality. Your payoff will derive from two assets; an 
appreciation of the value of your land and the profit that you make from each round. In 
order to maximize your payoff, it is imperative that you explore all options available to 
you. 
You have been assigned the role of farmer. This role will not change over the 
course of the experiment. You have two options of what to grow on your land: a full field 
of wheat or a full field of potatoes. The exact values of these options will be presented to 
you during the experiment. You will have several options to mitigate the externality, and 
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you can pay the rancher to reduce the amount of his livestock, also mitigating the size of 
the externality. Because this game is meant to test you and your partner’s ability to 
bargain, you will be given full access to your own production function, your partner’s 
production function, and the cost of solutions to the externality.  
Instructions for Participants 
(Rancher) 
In this game we will be testing your ability to negotiate with an anonymous 
partner over an externality you create. This game will last five rounds, and including 
instruction and review periods should last approximately one hour. Each round is eight 
minutes long; you can converse with your partner after the first two minutes of each 
round via a chat box located at the bottom of your screen. If you do not come to a deal or 
make a decision on how to mitigate the externality during these eight minutes, a rule that 
will be presented to you at the beginning of each round will take effect, and payoffs will 
be determined that way. You must make a production decision each round. In some 
rounds the farmer may be forced to bear the externality, and in others you may be forced 
to reimburse him or her. Your payoff will derive from two assets; an appreciation of the 
value of your land and the profit that you make from each round.  
 
You have been assigned the role of rancher. You can choose to raise up to five 
head of livestock on your property, but as you increase the amount, the externality 
increases in size. You can choose to decrease the size of your herd to reduce the 
externality, negotiate a deal with the farmer, or construct a fence. Because this game is 
meant to test you and your partner’s ability to bargain, you will be given full access to 
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your own production function, your partner’s production function, and the cost of 
solutions to the externality. Before you begin, it is imperative you realize that you are not 
at fault for the externality; you have been ranching for years, and the farmer recently 
expanded his land, creating the problem.  
Conclusions 
 CT plays a major role in economic analysis of law and has been the subject of 
debate for decades. However, most objections to the Coase theorem have been made on 
the basis that its internal logic is flawed, that it is not applicable to the real world, or that 
its assumptions are impractical. Few researchers have used empirical tests to study the 
psychology of participants in a Coasean bargaining situation, and none have completely 
adopted the framework of perfect CT situation, instead using consumer goods and non-
competitive games. But if it could be demonstrated that people placed in a real CT 
situation are not capable of the mental task in front of the, or cannot bargain rationally 
even when perfect information is given, then the Coase theorem has been weakened 
significantly. 
 This experiment is expressly designed to test this possibility, as well as 
demonstrate the underlying premise of the Coase theorem that legal rules can sometimes 
promote inefficiency. Participants are given adequate explanation beforehand, perfect 
information about each other’s production functions and the cost of the externality, and 
five rounds to gain experience. If, by the final round, participants are still unable to 
bargain or come to an efficient outcome, then we must question the validity of the Coase 
theorem.  
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 Finally, this experiment is relatively simple to run, and allows for easily 
changeable conditions; imperfect information about the other participant’s production 
function can be introduced, production values can be changed, and legal rules can shift. 
This creates the potential for further experimentation, as well as making the experiment 
more applicable to the real world.  
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